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Abstract
We present a simple model of smart money and dumb money. Dumb money tries
to learn from market prices whether or not it is dumb. Dumb money's ability to learn
depends on its openness to the idea that it may be the dumb money and on its ability
to assess the total amount of dumb money in the market. Neither requirement may be
met easily in the real world.
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\Men, it has been well said, think in herds, it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while
they only recover their senses slowly, and one-by-one."
-Charles MacKay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions And The Madness Of Crowds (1841)
1 Introduction
We study dumb money learning in a simple parimutuel betting model. Dumb money and
smart money bet on the occurrence of two exhaustive and mutually exclusive states of the
world. Smart money knows the actual probabilities of the two states. Dumb money holds
incorrect beliefs about the probabilities of the two states. Betting between smart money
and dumb money generates equilibrium state prices for the two states of the world. Dumb
money aects these equilibrium state prices even in the presence of smart money. Dumb
money earns negative abnormal returns in that equilibrium, while smart money earns positive
abnormal returns.
Our goal is to explore the possibility that dumb money may be able to learn its way out
of its bad beliefs using information in the observable state prices and its prior beliefs. Dumb
money in our model is exogenously endowed with a non-zero prior probability that it is the
dumb money and a prior joint probability distribution on the proportion of dumb money in
the market and the size of dumb money valuation errors. Dumb money learning requires
that dumb money can assess somewhat accurately the amount of dumb money in the market
and that dumb money not believe too strongly that it is the smart money.
Dumb money learning is not guaranteed, however. It may be very dicult to determine
what is the proportion of dumb money in the market, a key determinant of learning in our
model. Even identifying the possible candidates to take the title of \dumb money" can be a
challenge. In one form or another, people often ask of a group of investors, \Are they smart
money or dumb money?"1 It is unpersuasive, for example, to assert that all institutional
1See, for example, the question as asked in an article on sovereign wealth funds: Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.,
1investors are smart money, while all individual investors are dumb money. Many times the
question is which institutional investor is the smart money and which is the dumb money.2
Among nance researchers there is no agreement as to who constitutes the smart money.
As DeBondt and Thaler (1990, p. 56) state, \an interesting empirical question is whether
the presumed smart money segment actually can be identied." Lakonishok, Shleifer and
Vishny (1992) make a compelling case that much of the institutional money management
industry acts like dumb money. And there is no evidence that all individual investors are
dumb money.3 Dumb money can be seemingly on the right side of the bet for quite some
time.4 In some cases, such as when there is complete uncertainty about the proportions of
dumb money and smart money in the market, or when the proportion of dumb money and
smart money is equal, our model predicts that learning from prices that one is the dumb
money is impossible.
Dumb money learning also requires that dumb money be suciently open a priori to the
possibility of being the dumb money. But being open to the possibility of being the dumb
money requires a psychologically dicult self-evaluation that may be unlikely to occur very
often in the real world. Indeed, there is a sense in which the essence of being the dumb
money is thinking too strongly that one is the smart money. Additionally, the dumb money
is unlikely to be monolithic in openness to the possibility of being the dumb money. Dumb
money that is less open to the possibility of being the dumb money will nd it harder to
\Sovereign Wimp Funds," Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2008, p. A.24.
2In a recent article on a very large trade in silver ETF put options, one commodity trader was
quoted,\When you see a trade that size you're left scratching your head{ is it smart money or is it dumb
money...." Tatyana Shumsky and Brendan Conway, \Silver's Rally Spurs Betting by Doubters," Wall Street
Journal (Online), Apr 21, 2011.
3For example, Kelly (1997) identies higher-income households as smart money in a test of a smart
money-noise trader model. See also Keswani and Stolin (2008).
4Consider, example, the following quote from the Wall Street Journal during the Internet boom: \But so
far, the dumb money has been laughing all the way to the bank. It is the skeptical { smart money-investment
pros { that has been hurting." E.S. Browning and Aaron Lucchetti, \The New Chips: Conservative Investors
Finally Are Saying: Maybe Tech Isn't a Fad | Nasdaq Powers Past 5000 As Cisco, Oracle and Such Become
`Core' Stocks | Is the Shift Itself Bearish?" p. A.1. The NASDAQ peaked the same day.
2learn than dumb money more open to the possibility.
Ours is not a model of heterogeneous information. We assume that smart money and
dumb money in our model have access to what Harrison and Kreps (1978) call \the same
substantive economic information." Disagreement between smart money and dumb money
in our model is non-informational, attributable to the dierent implications that the same
information can have for dierent individuals, or to the inability of dumb money to notice
that it is trading on noise, not information [Black (1986)]. At the same, while our model is
one of heterogeneous beliefs, it diers from many such models where traders with dierent
beliefs cling inexibly to their views, even where their views are demonstrably inferior to the
views of other traders [see, for example, Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985), Harris
and Raviv (1993), Kandel and Pearson (1995), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)].5 Indeed,
one of our goals is to test the robustness of such inexibility, asking how and when dumb
money might learn to give up its bad investment strategy. In general, the potential diculty
with learning that we nd in our simple model provides some support to models that assume
away the problem of dumb money learning.
Overall, our model suggests that the problem of learning one's type in nancial markets
{ whether one is smart money or dumb money { may be as important as learning about
\noisy signals" of value, but that learning one's type may be quite dicult. Learning one's
type is a \rst order" problem. Learning that one is the dumb money may do far more
than cause one to shift one's bet a little in one direction or the other; learning one's type
may lead dumb money to change the direction of its bet, from going long to going short,
from betting on no default to betting on default, and so on. Our model also suggests which
markets may be more ecient and which less ecient based on the ease or diculty of dumb
money learning. The most ecient markets in our framework will be those with less dumb
5Formally, traders' measures typically are not absolutely continuous with respect to one another, meaning
that one may assign a zero value to some values that others assign positive value. See, for example, Harrison
and Kreps (1978).
3money and smaller dumb money valuation errors, which is obvious, but also those where
dumb money is more self-aware of the possibility of being the dumb money and where dumb
money makes relatively more accurate estimates of the amount of dumb money in the market,
which may be less obvious. Less ecient markets will be those with more dumb money that
makes bigger dumb money errors and is less self-aware of the possibility of being the dumb
money, and where dumb money does a poor job of estimating the amount of dumb money in
the market. In our framework, for example, a market with more institutional investors may
be more ecient not because institutional investors are \smart money" { though some surely
are { but because institutional investors may be more willing to entertain the possibility of
being the dumb money than individual investors. Some markets, such as certain xed income
markets, may be more ecient not only because valuation errors are smaller when made, but
because it may be easier to identify the proportion of dumb money in the market. Markets
with equal proportions of dumb money and smart money may be inecient, and remain so,
since dumb money in such markets cannot as easily determine whether or not it is the dumb
money.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents our simple model. Section 3 presents
the no-learning equilibrium. Section 4 examines the relative returns of smart money and
dumb money in the no learning equilibrium. Section 5 explores the possibility of dumb
money learning. Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic set-up
We consider a simple parimutuel betting market. In a parimutuel (from the French for
\mutual wager") betting market, the winners split the losers stakes. Parimutuel betting has
a natural interpretation as a market in states of the world, where traders place bets on the
subsequent existence of states of the world and those betting on the states that actually occur
4receive the payos of all the bets in proportion to the amounts they bet, while those betting
on states that do not occur receive nothing. Since the total stakes always can be normalized
at 1 unit, and since all the betting proceeds on the the mutually exclusive event are paid
to the winners who pick the winning event, the proportion of money bet on a given state is
interpretable as a \market probability" or equilibrium state price, that is, the equilibrium
probability that clears a market of traders betting on that state of the world. The parimutuel
betting system has been widely studied as an information aggregation market mechanism
in the context of horse racing, and the results support the assumption that the parimutuel
method is an eective method of aggregating beliefs.6
Two types of risk neutral traders bet on the outcome of a state-space. One type is the
smart money. The other type is the dumb money. Each type bets on G or B, a state of the
world that will obtain at a future date. These are exhaustive and mutually exclusive states
of the world, such as \up" or \down," \no default" or \default," and so on. Each bettor of a
given type shares a probability belief for the states, where   is the smart money probability
of G, so that the smart money probability of B is (1    ), and  is the dumb money
probability of G, so that the dumb money probability of B is (1   ). Because the dumb
money misjudges the probability of the underlying mutually exclusive states, and because
the probability of one state therefore is overestimated as a result, the type of calibration
error we explore is easily interpreted as a form of optimism bias where the dumb money is
optimistic about the state of the world to which it attaches too much probability [see, for
example, Malmendier and Tate (2005), Heaton (2002)]. Dumb money might also be what
Geanakopolos (2010) calls the natural buyer, a trader with a strong preference for taking one
6See, for example, Plott, Wit and Yang (2003): \Broadly summarized, this empirical literature has estab-
lished the existence of a clear monotone relationship between prices (odds) and observed relative frequencies
of winning. High priced bets, the favorites that pay low odds, win regularly whereas low priced bets, the long
shots that pay high odds, win occasionally. The information found revealed in naturally occurring examples
is not perfect. A `long shot bias' exists; the odds on long shots tend to be too high, but the bias is not
`large.'" On the long shot bias, see Thaler and Ziemba (1988).
5or another side of the market. We assume that the smart money probability,  , is the \true"
probability of G, though what is important in our analysis is only that the smart money is
more closely calibrated than the dumb money to the true probability so that we can make
statements about actual relative expected returns. We assume that smart money and dumb
money understand that the smart money probability is the true probability.
We dene  2 [0;1] as a \dumbness parameter," where j    j = . The dumbness
parameter measures the absolute size of the dumb money's valuation (probability) error
relative to the smart money probability. When  = 0,   =  and the dumb money is just
as smart as the smart money, that is, there is no valuation error. When  = 1, then one
of   or  is 0 and the other is 1. This is as far apart as it is possible for dumb money
and smart money to be. The intermediate cases follow. The dumbness parameter allows us
the exibility to consider dierent markets where the average size of dumb money valuation
errors may be dierent depending on the asset and the available asset valuation technology.
We assume that smart money knows with certainty that it is smart money, but that
dumb money does not know whether it is smart money or dumb money. We assume that
dumb money does not know that a characteristic of smart money is certainty about its smart
money status. Otherwise, mere uncertainty about one's status would indicate dumb money
status. An obvious extension of our approach is to introduce uncertainty among the smart
money as to whether it is smart or not. The dumb money knows its own probability, which
we denote ?, but does not not know whether ? =   (it is the smart money) or ? =  (it is
the dumb money). Dumb money traders share a common prior belief as to the probability of
being the dumb money. We denote this prior probability as p(? = ). The dumb money's
prior probability that it is the smart money is then p(? =  ) = 1   p(? = ). Before we
turn to the possibility of learning, we assume that dumb money is dogmatic about its view,
that is, dumb money bets ? =  and not a weighted average reecting prior beliefs. When
we discuss learning, below, we present the case where dumb money bets a weighted average
6belief, given its posterior probabilities on being the dumb or smart money.
The actual proportion of dumb money in the market is !, so the proportion of smart
money is 1 !. We normalize the amount bet to ! +(1 !) = 1. Traders do not know the
amount of dumb money in the market or the size of the valuation error that dumb money
makes. Dumb money's belief about valuation errors and the proportion of dumb money is
reected in a joint probability density, f(; !). The dumb money's marginal distribution for
the valuation errors is then f(), while the marginal distribution for the proportion of dumb
money is f(!). This framework allows us to accommodate a wide variety of markets where
beliefs about the proportion of dumb money in the market, and about the size of dumb
money valuation errors, may dier considerably. For example, many market participants
consider xed income markets to have both a higher percentage of smart money and lower
valuation errors than do equity markets. With certain kinds of markets, equity markets for
example, the proportion of dumb money and the size of dumb money valuation errors may
dier as well depending on the segment of the market. The joint probability density f(; !)
allows us to model these sorts of dierence across and within markets.
3 The No-Learning Equilibrium
We rst characterize the equilibrium that obtains before any learning might occur. In a
classic paper, Eisenberg and Gale (1959) demonstrate that there exists a unique equilibrium
of bets and market probabilities that clear a parimutuel betting market of this type.7 Recall
that   is the smart money probability of G, while  is the dumb money probability of G.
Smart money and dumb money will bet to maximize the subjective expected values of their
bets. We consider the situation where the equilibrium is that the dumb money bets on G
and the smart money bets on G. If that is to be an equilibrium, then it must be the case
7Brown and Lin (2003) explore the dynamics of this sort of equilibrium. A dynamic version of the model
presented here is possible along the same lines.
7that both dumb money and smart money are happy with their bets and have no reason to
move o of them. Thus, the following conditions hold in the equilibrium where dumb money
bets on G and smart money bets on B:
(dumbmoney) : maxf=!; (1   )=(1   !)g = =!
(smartmoney) : maxf(1    )=(1   !);  =!g = (1    )=(1   !)
Numerators are personal probabilities of dumb money and smart money. Numerators of
the form  are bets on the occurrence of G. Numerators of the form 1    are bets on the
occurrence of B. Denominators are proportions bet on the events. Denominators of the
form ! reect the total bets of the dumb money, because dumb money exists in the market
in proportion !. Denominators of the form 1 ! reect the bets of the smart money, because
smart money exists in the market in proportion 1   !.
In equilibrium, both types of traders \bet the odds," betting on the state of the world
where the ratio of their personal probability (their ) to the equilibrium state price (that is,
the proportion of money bet on that state) is the highest. This maximizes perceived expected
return. When dumb money bets on G and smart money bets on B, the proportion of money
bet on G is the proportion, !, of dumb money in the market, while the proportion of money
bet on B is the proportion, 1 !, of smart money in the market. These proportions are then
the market probabilities. The ratios =! and (1 )=(1 !) are the subjective expectations
of the dumb money of betting on G and B, respectively. For this to be an equilibrium
where the dumb money bets on G but not B, the ratio =! must be greater than the
ratio (1   )=(1   !). Otherwise, the dumb money would prefer to allocate money to the
available bet on B at its current price. At the same prices, however, the smart money ratio
(1    )=(1   !) must be greater than the smart money ratio  =!. Otherwise, the smart
money would prefer to allocate money to the available bet on G at its current price.
8Note that the equilibrium state prices { that is, the proportions bet on the two states
{ are not the smart money (true) probabilities. In this sense, the market is inecient.
State prices are not even weighted averages of dumb money and smart money beliefs; state
prices are the weights themselves. This is a characteristic of parimutuel markets. These
weights { and thus, the equilibrium state prices { clearly can dier signicantly from the
underlying true probability. In this sense, as in other models, dumb money traders may
drive prices far from \fundamentals" (here, fundamentals are the true probabilities) in ways
that capital-constrained arbitrageurs cannot correct.
Still, there is no way for smart money to further arbitrage the dumb money, because there
is not enough smart money in the market to do so. In this sense, our model incorporates
the concept of capital-constrained arbitrage in Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The collapse of
the value of subprime mortgage-backed securities presents a potential case study in support
of this result. As popular books like \The Big Short" describe [Lewis (2010)], a very small
number of smart money hedge funds were able to place bets on the collapse of subprime
mortgage-backed securities prices (and associated derivatives) at extremely attractive \odds"
against dumb money nancial institutions: \Supply [of credit default swaps on subprime
mortgage securities], thanks to AIG, was virtually unlimited. The problem was demand:
investors who wanted to do [the] trade. Incredibly, at this critical juncture in nancial
history, after which so much changed so quickly, the only constraint in the subprime mortgage
market was a shortage of people willing to bet against it." [Lewis (2010, p. 80)] The credit
default swaps that formed the \bets" that the hedge funds made bear a resemblance to the
parimutuel betting model we study here.8 At least ex post, there was too little smart money
in the market for credit default swaps on subprime mortgage-backed securities.9
8On default probabilities inherent in credit default swaps, see, for example, Berndt, et al. (2005).
9A similar circumstance occurs when smart money must short sell stock to speculate against mispricing
at times when an inadequate number of shares are available for shorting. See, for example, Shiller (2003, p.
97) ("The smart money who know that the stock is priced ridiculously high may well use up all the easily
available shortable shares and then will be standing on the sidelines, unable to short more shares and prot
94 Relative expected returns of smart money and dumb
money
Recall that dumb money (incorrectly) perceives odds on its bet on G of =!, while smart
money (correctly) perceives odds on its bet of (1    )=(1   !). The equilibrium conditions
necessary for dumb money to bet on G while smart money bets on B imply that the
proportion of dumb money traders is greater than the smart money probability but less
than the dumb money probability:   < ! < : This relationship helps us describe relative
expected returns of smart money and dumb money in the no-learning equilibrium.
The dumb money expects to receive  for total bets of !. Since ! < , this is a perceived
positive expected value bet. But dumb money actually receives (   ) =   for total bets
of !, where (   ) =   < !, a negative expected value bet. The bet transfers wealth in
expectation to the smart money. Smart money expects to receive (1    ) for a bet of 1   !,
where 1   ! < (1    ), a positive expected value bet. Thus, the resulting prices are bad for
dumb money and good for smart money.
If the state prices fully reected the smart money probability,  , then the market odds
would be 1=  and 1=(1    ) on G and B, respectively. Because the actual market odds
on G and B are 1=! and 1=(1   !), respectively, the odds on G (the dumb money bet)
are too low, since   < !, while the odds on B (the smart money bet) are too high, since
(1   !) < (1    ). This is implied by   < !, with   a probability and ! a proportion.
The higher is the proportion of dumb money, the worse it is for the dumb money and the
better it is for the smart money, holding constant   =    , the smart money probability.
The larger is , the dierence between the smart money probability and the dumb money
probability, the worse it is for the dumb money and the better it is for the smart money,
holding constant !. As we might expect, the gains to being the smart money are larger the
from their knowledge.")
10more dumb money is in the market and the bigger are the mistakes that the dumb money
makes.10
Consider a simple example. Let the dumb money probability  = 0:6, the smart money
probability   = 0:3, the proportion of dumb money in the market ! = 0:45. Dumb money
bets only on the state G while smart money bets only on the state B. This is an equilibrium
because the dumb money prefers betting on G since 0:6=0:45 > 0:4=0:55, while the smart
money prefers betting on B since 0:3=0:45 < 0:7=0:55. Both types of traders believe that
they are making positive expected value bets, and that the opposite bet is negative expected
value. Only the smart money's belief is correct, however. The dumb money expects to
receive  = 0:6 for total bets on G of ! = 0:45, a perceived positive expected value bet. But
dumb money actually receives   =   = 0:3 for a bet of 0:45. Betting on G at the market
probabilities is a negative expected value bet. The bet transfers wealth in expectation to the
smart money. Smart money expects to receive 1     = 0:7 for a bet on B of 1   ! = 0:55,
a positive expected value bet. The dumb money's loss of 0:15 is smart money's gain. If the
proportion of dumb money increased to ! = 0:5, holding constant  = 0:3 (  ), then dumb
money would expect to receive  = 0:6 for total bets on G of ! = 0:5, but would in fact
receive  0:2, the smart money's gain betting 0:5 for an expectation of 0:2. If the proportion
of dumb money is held constant at 0:45 while the smart money probability decreases to 0:25
(that is,  increases from 0:3 to 0:35), dumb money's expected gain is 0:15, but its actual
expected loss is 0:25   0:45 =  0:20.
10For another discussion of the eect of changing ratios of smart money to dumb money, see, for example,
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and (1989, p. 691).
115 Dumb money learning
\The old-fashioned way of measuring a persons beliefs is to propose a bet and see what are
the lowest odds which he will accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound. ...
[But] the proposal of a bet may inevitably alter his state of opinion."
-Frank P. Ramsey, Truth and Probability (1926).
We turn now to the possibility that dumb money might be able to learn that it is dumb
money { that is, learn its type { by considering the observable state prices, knowing that
those prices reect the interaction of dumb money and smart money beliefs. Our approach
is similar in spirit to Lindley (1982), who shows how one might improve on one's own
probability judgments by using information inherent in the probability judgments of others.
Here, the dumb money tries to improve its own probability judgment by using information
inherent in the market probability. Let m be the observable proportion of money bet on
G and 1   m be the observable proportion of money bet on B. Recall that dumb money
does not know if it is the smart money or the dumb money. Dumb money knows, however,
that the observable proportion m is one of two values depending on whether it is the dumb
money or the smart money. The proportion m is ! if the dumb money is betting on G, but
it is 1   ! if the smart money is betting on G.
The possibility of learning arises because dumb money can ask whether, given m, it is
more likely that ! = m (that is, more likely that it is the dumb money betting on G and
the smart money betting on B) or (noting that m = 1   ! =) ! = 1   m) more likely
that ! = 1 m (that is, more likely that it is the smart money betting on G and the dumb
money betting on B). Essentially, the dumb money can observe the proportion of investors
betting in the direction that it is betting. The dumb money understands that one side of
the betting is dumb money, while the other side of the betting is smart money. This is the
case since the odds are not even, which they would be if  = 0, that is, if there was no dumb
12money. The question for the dumb money is whether it is the dumb money or the smart
money. The answer to that question must depend on the dumb money's beliefs about those
proportions. Thus, learning depends on having a good sense of how much dumb money is in
the market as a proportion of all money in the market. This is a type of learning dierent
from, for example, learning from subsequent returns, a form of learning that may take a very
long time and require a relatively stationary environment.
The dumb money's Bayesian posterior odds are a natural expression of learning in this
sense. Posterior odds follow directly from personal probabilistic belief. If someone's prior
odds (odds prior to observing additional data, here m) in favor of some hypothesis are
1.5, that means the person believes the probability of the hypothesis to be 1.5 times the
probability of a mutually exclusive alternative hypothesis under consideration prior to seeing
the data. If the likelihood ratio of the data is, for example, 2, then the posterior odds are
2  1:5 = 3. That is, after seeing the data, the person now believes the probability of the
hypothesis to be 3 times the probability of the mutually exclusive alternative hypothesis.
Here, the mutually exclusive hypotheses are being dumb money or smart money, respectively,
and the data is the market price, m, on G. The dumb money's posterior odds that it is the
dumb money are thus:
p(? = jm)
p(? =  jm)
=
p(mj? = )
p(mj? =  )
p(? = )
p(? =  )
=
p(! = m)
p(! = 1   m)
p(? = )
p(? =  )
The Bayesian posterior odds are the likelihood ratio times the prior odds. The likelihood
ratio is the probability that ! = m divided by the probability that ! = 1   m, where
f(!), the marginal distribution for ! from f(; !). This is the case because the probability
of observing proportion m given that the trader is the dumb money is the probability that
! = m, while the probability of observing proportion m given that the trader is the smart
money is the probability that ! = 1   m. The Bayesian posterior odds of being the dumb
13money are higher when it is more probable, under f(!), that ! = m than that ! = 1   m.
The prior odds are simply the prior probability (in the mind of the dumb money trader)
that it is the dumb money divided by the prior probability (in the mind of the same dumb
money trader) that it is the smart money. The prior odds measure the willingness of the
dumb money to believe, a priori, that it is the dumb money and not the smart money.
The posterior odds allow the following set of possible inferences:
p(? = jm)
p(? =  jm)
> 1 learning (I am probably dumb money)
p(? = jm)
p(? =  jm)
 1 no learning (I am probably smart money)
If the posterior odds on being the dumb money are greater than 1, then the dumb money
concludes it is more likely to be dumb money. The posterior odds are higher the more
likely it seems to the dumb money that the observed proportion that includes its bet is the
proportion of dumb money in the market, and the more likely that the dumb money believes
itself likely to be the dumb money. If the posterior odds on being the dumb money are less
than 1, the dumb money concludes it is more likely to be smart money. Returning to our
example where  = 0:6,   = 0:3, and ! = 0:45, suppose that under the the dumb money's
prior distribution for !, f(!), values of ! < 0:50 are twice as likely as values of ! > 0:50,
that is, the dumb money believes that a little dumb money in the market is more likely than
a lot of dumb money. Suppose further that the dumb money has even prior odds (that is,
50/50) on being the dumb money. In this case, the dumb money will calculate
14p(? = j0:45)
p(? =  j0:45)
= 2 > 1 learning (I am probably dumb money)
We can see that there are two determinants of the ease or diculty of dumb money
learning in this simple model. First, dumb money learning is harder when the probability
that ! = m is close to the probability that ! = 1   m. That is, it is hard for dumb money
to infer that the proportion it is betting with is the dumb money if the proportion and
its complement are both more or less equally likely. In general, this will depend on dumb
money's prior beliefs about the proportion of dumb money in the market, but an extreme
example that does not depend on the shape of the f(!) distribution is when m = 1 m = 0:5,
that is, when there an equal proportion of dumb money and smart money. In that case,
dumb money cannot learn from the market price, because, whatever is the shape of f(!),
p(! = m = 0:5) = p(! = 1 m = 0:5). While we do not model it here, this fact suggests the
interesting possibility { appropriate for future research { that an increase in the proportion
of smart money toward 0.5, if accurately perceived by the dumb money, might actually make
learning more dicult. While the increase in smart money would, in general, increase the
quality of the price without learning, it remains an interesting question whether the eect
of the increase toward 0.5 on making learning harder would leave a market such as we study
here better o or worse o on balance.
Second, dumb money learning is harder when dumb money is tilted too far in its prior
beliefs in favor of being the smart money. Being open to the possibility of being the dumb
money requires a psychologically dicult self-evaluation. Even where the dumb money
believes that there is a preponderance of dumb money in the market, dumb money may
ignore such \base rates" in forming their prior beliefs [see Kahneman and Tversky (1974)],
15continuing to believe that they probably are the smart money. Even a uniform prior on being
dumb money might be hard to muster, psychologically speaking. Few people may be able to
believe that it is as likely as not that they are the dumb money. Past trading success may
exacerbate the problem, even creating dumb money: Gervais and Odean (2001) show how
trading successes can lead to overcondence in one's ability. Nevertheless, it may be easier
to muster this sort of self-criticism in some markets rather than others. In markets, such as
derivatives markets and certain xed income markets, where pricing is known to be highly
quantitative, those lacking such skills may nd it easier to assume that they may be the
dumb money in those markets. By contrast, in markets less subject to highly quantitative,
arbitrage-based pricing, such as in equity markets, it may be more dicult for dumb money to
believe that its views are any less well-shaped than others, especially since reliable modeling
is more dicult in such environments and those without highly quantitative strategies often
do better than those employing them.
Third, it is not enough that the dumb money may determine that it is more likely dumb
money than smart money. Dumb money learning must be strong enough to allow an updating
of dumb money's beliefs (of ? given m) to a value that causes the dumb money to wish to
revise its current bet. The dumb money can update ? given m to

?jm = p(
? =  jm)
? + p(
? = jm)(
?   
?)
The updated ? is a weighted average of two possibilities: the trader is the smart money
or the trader is the dumb money. If the trader is the smart money, then ? =  . The
probability that the trader is the smart money, given m, is p(? =  jm). If the trader is
the dumb money, then ? = . The probability that the trader is the dumb money, given
m, is p(? = jm). If the trader is the dumb money, and ? = , the the trader knows
that his probability is incorrect by amount . The trader does not know , but does have a
16marginal distribution, f(), and can estimate   by ?   ?, where ?, where ? is the dumb
money's estimate of  given its probability distribution, f(). Recall that the equilibrium
conditions when dumb money bets on G and the smart money bets on B imply that the
proportion of dumb money traders is greater than the smart money probability but less than
the probability of the dumb money probability:   < ! < . If   < ! < ?jm, the dumb
money will not want to change its bet despite believing that it probably is the dumb money.
The dumb money is more likely to want to change its bet the larger is p(? = jm) and
?, that is, the more likely it is, given m, that it is the dumb money, and the larger is the
expected valuation error given that one is the dumb money.
What happens if dumb money does decide to abandon its beliefs? In order for a price
impact to occur, there must be additional betting. Recall that the initial equilibrium prob-
abilities are ! on G and 1 ! on B, respectively. At these market probabilities, the dumb
money (inaccurately) perceived odds =! > (1 )=(1 !), while smart money (accurately)
perceived odds (1   )=(1 !) >  =!. When dumb money learns fully, it knows it is misper-
ceiving the market probabilities, that  = ?, and that   = ? . Dumb money understands
that if all traders held the correct belief, then the market odds must be such as to leave the
bettors (all of whom then share the same beliefs) indierent between the bets on G and B.
Dumb money knows that it has not correctly estimated  unless and until it is indierent
between G and B. Dumb money's knowledge that it has not correctly estimated  unless
and until it is indierent between the available bets acts as a sort of \reverse lemons" prob-
lem where only high quality beliefs survive [compare Akerlof (1970)]. However, this happens
only when dumb money has learned suciently to want to change its bet.
176 Conclusion
We explore a model of smart money and dumb money where dumb money tries to learn
its type from equilibrium state prices. Our model is related in spirit to an early literature
that studied whether and how prices reect the dierent information or dierent \signals"
of an asset's value that dierent investors may have. Implicit in the structure of those early
models was the assumption that investors understand that each has access to only some of the
valuation-relevant data. Each is willing to learn what information other investors are holding.
Depending on the model, the price may allow them to do so, revealing all [see, for example,
Grossman (1976, 1978)] or some [see, for example, Figlewski (1978)] of the valuation-relevant
data that investors collectively hold. Yet, so long as poorly informed investors continue to
exist in the market in sucient proportion, prices may continue to reect their poor beliefs
[Feiger (1978)]. Our model considers the inverse problem of identifying beliefs reected in the
equilibrium. Price can reveal something about whether one's beliefs are more likely smart
money beliefs or dumb money beliefs. In our model, dumb money traders know this, and
that makes learning possible, if not guaranteed.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the possibility that irrational traders may aect
asset prices.11 There are two serious objections to the assertion that irrational traders can
inuence prices persistently. First, there is the objection that rational traders will exploit
irrational traders and drive irrationality-induced price deviations to zero (see Friedman,
1953; Fama, 1965) or near-zero (see Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) levels. We may call this
the \arbitrage objection." To rebut the arbitrage objection, researchers have argued that
real-world arbitrage is more dicult than researchers recognize [Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Barberis and Thaler (2003)]. In our model, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), a limited supply
11A comprehensive early review is Barberis and Thaler (2003). Seminal papers in the literature include
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1991), Campbell and Kyle (1993), Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Odean (1998), Hong and Stein (1998),
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
18of smart money limits arbitrage. Second, there is the objection that irrational traders can
learn that they are being irrational and change their behavior. As DeLong, et al. (1990a)
observe, \An important objection to this approach is that [irrational traders] are really dumb:
they do not realize how much money they lose.... Why don't [irrational] traders...learn that
they are making mistakes...?" We may call this the \learning objection." While researchers
have paid considerable attention to rebutting the arbitrage objection, the learning objection
remains largely unexplored. Nevertheless, it remains a signicant hurdle to the viability of
predictions that irrational traders may aect asset prices. Our paper addresses an aspect of
the learning objection by exploring the problem of dumb money learning.
In an episode of the sitcom, \Seinfeld" titled \The Opposite," George Costanza com-
plains, \My life is the opposite of everything I want it to be. Every instinct I have, in every
aspect of life, be it something to wear, something to eat ... It's all been wrong." Jerry Se-
infeld convinces George to do the opposite of everything he's been doing, and, for the rest
of the episode, George enjoys great success. Dumb money is the George Costanza of the
capital market. Occasionally, however, even if only for an episode or two, it may learn to
\do the opposite" and behave like smart money.
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